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Abstract
We propose a new solution concept to address the problem of sharing a surplus among the
agents generating it. The sharing problem is formulated in the preferences-endowments
space. The solution is defined in a recursive manner incorporating notions of consistency
and fairness and relying on properties satisfied by the Shapley value for Transferable
Utility (TU) games. We show a solution exists, and refer to it as an Ordinal Shapley
value (OSV ). The OSV associates with each problem an allocation as well as a matrix
of concessions “measuring” the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. We
analyze the structure of the concessions, and show they are unique and symmetric. Next
we characterize the OSV using the notion of coalitional dividends, and furthermore show
it is monotone in an agent’s initial endowments and satisfies anonymity. Finally, similarly
to the weighted Shapley value for TU games, we construct a weighted OSV as well.
JEL Classification numbers: C72, D50, D63.
Keywords: Non-Transferable utility games, Shapley Value, Ordinal Shapley Value,
consistency, fairness.
1 Introduction
A feature common to most economic environments is that the interaction among agents,
be it through exchange, production or both, generates benefits shared among the partic-
ipating individuals. The question of what interactions would or should occur, and what
would be the resulting distribution of gains has been central to economic theory. It has
been approached both from the normative and the positive point of view.
The normative point of view led to the analysis of existence and properties of al-
locations satisfying “desirable” criteria such as efficiency (Pareto optimality), fairness
(envy-freeness and egalitarianism) and others. The positive point of view resulted in the
analysis of outcomes generated by the interaction of the agents within given institutional
structures, focusing first on competitive environments and later on the study of environ-
ments where agents possess varying degrees of market power. Game theory, cooperative
and non-cooperative, has provided several important insights with respect to the norma-
tive and positive points of view. In this paper, we focus on the normative approach. We
propose and analyze a new solution concept that satisfies appealing properties in economic
environments.
Cooperative game theory has been especially useful in one particular class of economic
environments, the one characterized by transferable utility (TU ), where there exists a
“numeraire” commodity that all agents value the same in terms of utility. For that class,
there exist several popular notions of the distribution of gains, referred to as surplus
sharing, the most well-known of which are the Core and the Shapley Value. These satisfy
several desirable normative properties such as efficiency and group stability in the case of
the core, and efficiency, fairness and consistency for the Shapley value.
Extending the notion of the Core to more general environments with non-transferable
utility (NTU ) is straightforward. However, the extension of the central concept of the
Shapley Value turns out to be a much more demanding task. All known extensions
describe the environment in the utility space, i.e., specifying feasible utility tuples, ab-
stracting from the physical environment generating the tuples. A surplus sharing method
is then a rule prescribing, for each environment, the utility profiles that the whole set (the
grand coalition) of agents should receive.
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The three known extensions of the Shapley value associate with each environment one
or more TU games, and use their Shapley value to generate a surplus sharing method.
To define such a method, Shapley (1969) associates with each environment a TU game,
by means of a weights vector, giving the “worth” of each utility tuple. This TU game has
a well-defined Shapley value. If this value is feasible for the original game, it is a utility
profile associated with this environment. Aumann (1985) provides an axiomatization of
this solution. Harsanyi (1959) suggests a different extension, by stressing the idea of
equity. His solution contains the notion of coalitional “dividends” and each agent must
end up with a payoff corresponding to the sum of his dividends. An axiomatization for
this solution is provided in Hart (1985). Finally, Maschler and Owen (1989) and (1992),
using a TU game associated with the grand coalition, provide an extension preserving
the consistency properties of the Shapley value. Hart and Mas-Collel (1996) present a
model of non-cooperative bargaining that yields the Maschler-Owen consistent value in
environments with non-transferable utility.
A major shortcoming of the extensions of the Shapley Value is that the solutions
are not invariant to order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. The notion
of invariance has been addressed in the literature in two different ways. One approach
considers bargaining problems, where the environment is given by the utility possibilities
frontier for the whole set of agents and the disagreement point. A solution is then said to
be ordinal, if it is invariant with respect to strictly increasing monotonic transformations
of these entities. Shapley (1969) shows that there does not exist an ordinal, efficient
and anonymous solution for the case of two agents, and constructs one for the three-agent
case. Samet and Safra (2001), using constructions similar to O’Neill et al. (2001), provide
a family of ordinal, efficient and anonymous solutions for bargaining problems with any
number of agents greater than two. Safra and Samet (2001) provide yet another family
of such solutions.
The second approach towards the ordinality issue considers the underlying physical
environment generating the utility possibilities frontier. This approach better captures
the basic structure of the environment since identical economic environments may lead
to drastically different utility possibility frontiers (corresponding to different bargaining
problems), by appropriate choices of utility functions that represent the same preferences.
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In this approach the solution is defined in terms of the physical environment, i.e., in terms
of allocations of commodity bundles.
To clarify the difference between the two approaches towards the analysis of ordinality,
take the example of a two-agent exchange economy. Consider the representation of this
economy as an NTU game (or equivalently, a bargaining game). Following Shapley (1969)
there is no ordinal, efficient and anonymous solution concept for this game. However, it is
clear there are several ordinal, efficient and anonymous solution concepts for the exchange
economy such as the competitive equilibrium, the core and others. Therefore, an ordinal
solution for the economic environment need not be an ordinal solution for the NTU game.
Similarly, an ordinal NTU solution need not be ordinal if analyzed as a solution for the
economic environment.
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) provide a family of ordinal solutions given by Pareto-
Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent (PEEE) allocations for exchange economies. They con-
sider the problem of allocating a bundle of goods among a set of agents. In their envi-
ronment, each of the agents has the same a priori rights. An allocation is PEEE if it
is Pareto efficient and fair, in the sense that there exists a fixed commodity bundle (the
same for each agent) such that each agent is indifferent between this bundle and what he
gets in the allocation. Crawford (1979) and Demange (1984) propose procedures for im-
plementing PEEE allocations. McLean and Postlewaite (1989) consider pure exchange
economies as well, and define an ordinal solution given by nucleolus allocations, extending
the notion of a nucleolus defined for TU games in Schmeidler (1969). Nicolo` and Perea
(2002) also start from the physical environment, and provide ordinal solutions for the case
of two agents that, under some conditions, also extend to environments with any number
of agents.
Our work continues this line of research by proposing an ordinal solution based on the
physical environment. This new solution incorporates several of the principles underlying
the Shapley value in TU environments, and will be referred to as an Ordinal Shapley Value
(OSV ). It generalizes the fairness notion (of PEEE) by considering possibly different
a priori rights (i.e., different initial endowments), and also the options agents have in
any possible subgroup, and not just their own initial endowments. It is consistent in
the sense that agents’ payoffs are based on what they would get according to this rule
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when applied to sub-environments. In addition to these important properties of equity
and consistency, the solution is efficient, monotonic, anonymous, and satisfies individual
rationality. Also, the OSV is characterized through the use of “coalitional dividends”
similar to the characterization of the Shapley value by the use of Harsanyi dividends
(Harsanyi, 1959).
In the next Section we start by reviewing the Shapley value in TU environments.
We characterize the Shapley value by the behavior of value differences (the change in a
player’s value when moving from a game with n − 1 agents to a game with n agents),
and recall the coalitional dividends approach as well. In Section 3 we describe the pure
exchange economy underlying the NTU environment and introduce the OSV , building on
the characterization of the Shapley value for TU environments provided in the previous
section. In Section 4 we analyze the OSV for two-agent economies, and compare it to
existing constructions. In Section 5, we prove that an OSV exists for any number of
agents and furthermore it is individually rational. In Section 6, we start by proving the
construction of the OSV satisfies a symmetry property. We then proceed to characterize
the OSV via coalitional dividends, and provide further properties of the solution. In
Section 7, we show how to generate a family of weighted OSV s, providing an ordinal
analogue to the weighted Shapley values for TU environments. In Section 8, we conclude
and discuss further directions of research.
2 The Shapley Value in TU environments: A New
Characterization
Consider a Transferable Utility (TU ) game (N, v), where N = {1, ..., n} is the set of
players, and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0, where ∅ is the
empty set. For a coalition S ⊆ N, 1 v(S) represents the total payoff that the partners in
S can jointly obtain if this coalition is formed. We define a value as a mapping ξ which
associates with every game (N, v) a vector in Rn that satisfies
S
i∈N ξi(N, v) = v(N).
1Throughout the paper, we use ⊆ to denote the weak inclusion and ⊂ to denote the strict inclusion.
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The Shapley value (Shapley, 1953a) of every agent i ∈ N in the TU game (N, v) is:
φi(N, v) =
[
S⊆N\{i}
|S|!(n− |S|− 1)!
n!
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)],
where |S| denotes the cardinality of the subset S. The Shapley value can be interpreted
as the expected marginal contribution made by a player to the value of a coalition, where
the distribution of coalitions is such that any ordering of players is equally likely.
The next theorem provides a new characterization of the Shapley value, the interpre-
tation of which follows the theorem.
Theorem 1 A value ξ is the Shapley value if and only if it satisfies:
[
i∈N\j
(ξi(N, v)− ξi(N\j, v)) =
[
i∈N\j
(ξj(N, v)− ξj(N\i, v)) (1)
for all j ∈ N and for all (N, v).
Proof. To prove that the Shapley value satisfies the equality note that (1) is equivalent
(rearranging terms and using
S
i∈N ξi(N, v) = v(N)) to:
ξj(N, v) =
1
n
[v(N)− v(N\j)] + 1
n
[
i∈N\j
ξj(N\i, v). (2)
It is easy to check that the Shapley value satisfies (2). (This equality has been previously
used by Maschler and Owen (1989) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989).)
Furthermore suppose that equality (1), equivalently (2), is satisfied by the value ξ, for
all j ∈ N and for all (N, v). Since (2) provides a unique recursive way of calculating ξ
starting with ξi({i}, v) = v({i}), it characterizes the Shapley value, which completes the
proof.
The expression φi(N, v)−φi(N\j, v) is usually referred to as the contribution of player
j to the Shapley value of player i. It corresponds to the amount that makes player i
indifferent between receiving the value suggested to him in the game (N, v), or receiving
this payment and reapplying the value concept to the game without player j. Theorem
1 states that a value is the Shapley value if and only if, for any player j, the sum of the
contributions of player j to the other players is equal to the sum of the contributions of
the other players to player j.
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We refer to the difference φi(N, v)−φi(N\j, v) as a concession, what player j concedes
to player i, and denote it by cji .
2 In fact, an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is the
following:
Corollary 1 A value ξ is the Shapley value if and only if for each game (N, v) there
exists a matrix of concessions c(N, v) ≡ (cij(N, v))i,j∈N,i=j, with cij(N, v) in R for all
i, j ∈ N, i 9= j, such that:
(1) ξi(N, v) = ξi(N\j, v) + cji (N, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j, and
(2)
S
i∈N\j
cji (N, v) =
S
i∈N\j
cij(N, v) for all j ∈ N.
We can view part ( 1) in Corollary 1 as a consistency property of the Shapley value.
When the n − 1 players other than j consider the value offered to them by the solution
concept, they contemplate what might happen if they decide to go on their own. However,
the resources at their disposal should incorporate rents they could conceivably achieve by
cooperating with j. We call these rents the concessions of j to the other players.
Since the value is efficient and due to the consistency property of the concessions,
the sum of concessions a player makes is a measure of the surplus left to others, once
he has been compensated according to the solution concept. Therefore, part ( 2) can be
interpreted as a fairness requirement: the concessions balance out, the sum of concessions
one player makes to the others equals the sum of concessions the others make to him.
We now briefly describe some characteristics of the concessions.
For a TU game (N, v), for any coalition S ⊆ N, let the game wS be the unanimity game
(i.e., wS(T ) = 1 if T ⊇ S,wS(T ) = 0 otherwise). It is well known that the characteristic
function v can be written as linear combination of unanimity games: v =
S
S⊆N αSwS.
Denoting λS = αS|S| for all S ⊆ N, the Shapley value can be written (see Harsanyi, 1959)
as:
φi(N, v) =
[
Si
S⊆N
λS for all i ∈ N. (3)
2See also Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), where concessions are interpreted as bids.
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It follows that:
cji (N, v) =
[
Si,j
S⊆N
λS for all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j.
An immediate implication of the previous equality is that, in TU games, the concessions
are symmetric in the sense that what player j concedes to i is the same as what player i
concedes to j. The symmetry of the concessions corresponds to the balanced contributions
property (see Myerson, 1980).
Another interesting property of the concessions is that, although they can in general
be positive of negative, they are always non-negative if the game is convex. The game
(N, v) is convex if, for all S, T ⊆ N with S ⊂ T and i /∈ T we have:
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) ≤ v(T ∪ {i})− v(T ).
Next proposition states the result.
Proposition 1 If the TU game (N, v) is convex, all the concessions cji (N, v) are non-
negative.
Proof. The concession cji (N, v) = φi(N, v)− φi(N\j, v) is the difference between the
Shapley value of agent i in the game with all the agents and agent i’s Shapley value in
the game without agent j. Sprumont (1990) showed that for convex games the Shapley
value is a population monotonic allocation scheme. Each agent’s Shapley value increases
as the coalition to which he belongs expands. Thus, φi(N, v)− φi(N\j, v) ≥ 0 and hence
the concessions are non-negative.
To complete the section, we point out that a value can be expressed in terms of the
“Harsanyi dividends” (they are also called coalitional dividends), given in equation (3) if
and only if it is the Shapley value. We return to this characterization when analyzing the
properties of our proposal.
Proposition 2 A value ξ is the Shapley value if and only if, for any game (N, v) there
exists µS ∈ R for all S ⊆ N such that,
ξi(T, v) =
[
Si
S⊆T
µS for all i ∈ T, for all T ⊆ N . (4)
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Proof. The fact that the Shapley value satisfies this property was shown by Harsanyi
(1959) and it is stated in (3). To show the sufficiency we note that (4) implies that ξ is
an egalitarian solution and hence must be the Shapley value (see Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green (1995, pp. 680-681) for the definition of an egalitarian solution and the fact it
coincides with the Shapley value).
In the next section we describe the NTU environment, and define an ordinal solution
concept. As will be evident from the construction it generalizes the Shapley value notion,
and hence we call it an Ordinal Shapley value.
3 The Environment and the Solution
We consider a pure exchange economy with a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of agents and k ≥ 2
commodities. Agent i ∈ N is described by {i, wi}, where wi ∈ Rk+ is the vector of initial
endowments and i is the preference relation defined over Rk. We denote by "i and ∼i
the strict preference and indifference relationships associated with i. For each i ∈ N ,
the preference relation i is assumed to be continuous and strictly increasing on Rk. We
let ui be a utility function representing the preferences of agent i.
We let w ≡
S
i∈N
wi. The set of feasible utility profiles in Rn is denoted by A and defined
by:
A =
+
u ∈ Rn|∃ xi
i=1,...,n
∈ Rkn, such that ui(xi) = ui, i = 1, ..., n and
[
i∈N
xi ≤ w
,
.
Agents can conceivably be better off by reallocating their initial endowments. However, it
should not be possible for the utility of one agent to grow arbitrarily large if the utilities
of the other agents are bounded from below. To capture this idea, we assume that, for
any u ∈ A and i ∈ N, the set Ai(u) ≡ {u ∈ A|u−i = u−i} is bounded from above.3 In this
paper, any pure exchange economy that satisfies the previous requirements is referred to
as an economic environment.
3For a vector x ∈ Rn and i ∈ N , x−i ≡ (x1,...,xi−1,xi+1,...,xn}.
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3.1 An Ordinal Solution
We propose a solution concept, called the Ordinal Shapley Value (OSV ), for pure ex-
change economies, the construction of which relies on the notion of concessions. However,
since these economies constitute NTU environments, which are described in terms of the
underlying physical structure, concessions cannot be in the form of utility transfers. Con-
cessions are expressed in terms of commodities. We measure them in terms of a “base
bundle” which we take to be e = (1, ..., 1) ∈ Rk. The main characteristic of the concept
proposed is that it is ordinal. That is, the solution associates with each economy a set of
allocations that does not depend on the numerical representation of the underlying prefer-
ences of the agents. Moreover, the solution proposed is efficient and satisfies consistency
and fairness requirements.
Any (efficient) allocation can be viewed as a sharing of the surplus generated by the
possibility of exchange among the agents. What is a “fair” and “consistent” sharing? Let
us first discuss the rationale of our proposal in the case of two agents. According to our
proposal, a sharing is fair if the gains from cooperation are equally distributed among the
two agents. A crucial question is how to measure these gains. In our proposal, the benefits
from cooperation are measured in terms of e. The gain of each agent is the amount of e
units that when added to his initial endowment, yields a bundle indifferent to the bundle
received by the sharing. This amount of e assumes the role of the difference in values (in
the TU case).
A sharing is consistent if each agent is indifferent between the sharing outcome and
what he could get if he were to walk away and keep what remains of the aggregate
endowment, after compensating the other agent according to the solution concept. How
should the other agent be compensated or what part of the surplus can the agent who
walks away, keep? We measure the surplus he can keep by the maximal amount of e units
for which, when he receives a bundle indifferent to his initial endowment augmented by
that amount of e units, the other agent is left with a bundle equivalent to the bundle
he received in the sharing. To state these properties more succinctly we use the notion
of a concession just as in the TU case. An efficient sharing is fair and consistent if
there exists a pair of concessions such that the concession made by agent i to agent j
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equals the concession made by agent j to agent i, and each agent is indifferent between
keeping this allocation or taking the concession proposed by the other (to add to his initial
endowment).
Extending this notion to the n-person case, a solution is an efficient allocation for which
there exists a matrix of concessions, one from each agent to any other agent, satisfying
consistency and fairness. The consistency property now requires that any set of (n − 1)
agents should be indifferent between keeping their allocation or taking the concessions
made by the remaining agent and reapplying the solution concept to the (n − 1)-agent
economy. The sum of concessions an agent makes is a measure of the surplus left to
others in terms of the commodity bundle e, once he has been compensated according to
the solution concept. Similar to the Hart and Mas-Collel (1989) definition of consistency,
any (n − 1) agents are indifferent between what the solution offers them, in the n-agent
economy, and what the solution prescribes if they walk away with the surplus generated
in the n-agent economy, after the remaining agent receives what the original solution gave
him. The recursive nature of the definition implies that this consistency property extends
to coalitions of any size.
Moreover, to ensure that the allocation reached is “fair”, we require the concessions to
balance out, in the sense that the sum of concessions one player makes to the others equals
the sum of concessions the others make to him. In other words, the surplus generated
for any set of n − 1 agents is the same as the surplus they are willing to concede to the
remaining agent.
The formal definition of this solution concept, the OSV , is as follows:
Definition 1 The Ordinal Shapley Value is defined recursively.
(n = 1) In the case of an economy with one agent with preferences 1 and initial
endowments a1 ∈ Rk, the OSV is given by the initial endowment: OSV (1, a1) = {a1} .
Suppose that the solution has been defined for any economy with (n−1) or less agents.
(n) In the case of an economy (i, ai)i∈N with a set N of n agents, the OSV ((i, ai)i∈N)
is the set of efficient allocations (xi)i∈N for which there exists an n−tuple of concession
vectors (ci)i∈N that satisfy
n.1) for all j ∈ N, there exists y(j) ∈ OSV

(i, ai + cjie)i∈N\j

such that xi ∼i y(j)i
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for all i ∈ N\j, and
n.2)
S
i∈N\j
cji =
S
i∈N\j
cij for all j ∈ N.
It is not clear a priori whether or not the requirements of the definition of an OSV
are mutually compatible. Before proving the existence of an OSV for any economic
environment, we consider in the next section the existence and properties of the OSV for
economies with two agents.
It should be noted that the choice of the bundle e to measure the surplus that accrues
to each agent is arbitrary. An OSV could be constructed by using any other vector in
Rk+. The following analysis is valid regardless of the particular reference bundle chosen.
Note also that this solution concept reduces to the Shapley value in economic envi-
ronments that can be described as a TU environment. In such environments there is
a common unit of account which can be thought of as money, and agents’ preferences
are (normalized) quasi linear of the form m + ui(x) where m is “money”, ui is a utility
function, and x is a commodity vector. If we measure concessions in terms of money (m),
our solution yields the Shapley value.
4 The solution in the two-agent economy
For a two-agent economy, an OSV is an efficient allocation for which there exists an
identical concession for each agent, such that any agent is indifferent between the bundle
offered to him in the allocation or taking the concession and staying on his own.
In order to characterize a solution (xi)i=1,2 in the two-agent economy, notice first
that, by efficiency, the bundle of player 1, x1, must be the best for him among all the
allocations that leave agent 2 indifferent or better off than the bundle x2.Moreover, agent
2 is indifferent between x2 and w2 + c1e, and similarly, agent 1 is indifferent between x1
and w1+ c2e. Given that the concessions are the same, c ≡ c1 = c2, they must satisfy the
following equality:
u1(w1 + ce) = max(z1,z2) u
1(z1)
s.t. u2(z2) ≥ u2(w2 + ce)
z1 + z2 ≤ w1 + w2.
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The solution to this equation is given by the maximal real number c (which is non-
negative) that satisfies:
(u1(w1 + ce), u2(w2 + ce)) ∈ A.
Since preferences are strictly increasing and the sets Ai(u) are bounded, the previous
c exists and is unique. Note that the concession in the OSV depends on the initial
endowments. The OSV for the two-agent economy consists of the efficient allocations
(x1, x2) such that u1(x1) = u1(w1 + ce) and u2(x2) = u2(w2 + ce). When preferences are
strictly quasiconcave, the OSV allocation is unique.
For the two-agent economy the OSV has a very natural graphical representation.
Figure 1 depicts the OSV when n = 2 and there are two commodities.
[Insert Figure 1]
For two-agent economies, our proposal bears many similarities to two previous solu-
tion concepts. First, it is similar to the Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent (PEEE)
allocation proposed by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978), when addressing the issue of al-
locating a bundle of goods among a set of agents. The OSV allocation when the two
agents have the same initial endowments is a PEEE allocation as well. Note that by
choosing different commodity bundles to concede with, we can generate a family of OSV
allocations, all of which are PEEE.
Nicolo` and Perea (2002) also propose an ordinal solution concept for two-person bar-
gaining situations. Their construction yields the OSV for the class of exchange economies
where aggregate endowments of all the commodities are equal and are shared equally
among the two agents. Furthermore, while we require indifference with respect to adding
to the two agents initial endowments, multiples of e, they require indifference with re-
spect to adding to each agent’s initial endowment a multiple of the other agent’s initial
endowment.
5 Existence of the OSV in the general case
As noted before, it is not obvious there exists an efficient allocation for which one can find
concessions satisfying the requirements imposed by the definition of an OSV . To show
12
such allocations exist, we invoke in Theorem 2 a fixed point argument. Furthermore we
show that allocations in the OSV satisfy the desirable property of individual rationality,
that is, if x ∈ OSV ((i, wi)i∈N) , then xi  wi, for all i ∈ N.
We first prove the following lemma which plays an important role in the proof of
Theorem 2 and is used in several propositions and comments throughout the paper.
Lemma 1 For any u ∈ Rn in the range of the utility functions, there exists a unique
vector a ∈ Rn such that an OSV for the n−agent economy (i, wi + aie)i∈N yields the
utility tuple u.
Proof. Lemma 1 is true for n = 1 by monotonicity and continuity of the preferences.
We assume it holds for n − 1 and show it also holds for n. For each j ∈ N, let (eaji )i∈N\j
be the unique vector such that the economy with (n− 1) agents with initial endowments
(wi + eajie)i∈N\j has an OSV yielding the (n− 1)−utility tuple u−j.
To prove the existence of such a vector a ∈ Rn, we propose concessions

cji

i,j∈N,i=j
and prove that they support an OSV yielding the utility vector u. The proposal involves
the unknowns ai, for i ∈ N, as follows:
cji = −ai + eaji for i, j ∈ N, i 9= j.
The proposed concessions, in order to support an OSV , must satisfy the “fairness” con-
dition n.2) :
[
i∈N\j
cji =
[
i∈N\j
cij for j ∈ N,
yielding a system of linear equations given by:
[
i∈N\j

−ai + eaji

= −(n− 1)aj +
[
i∈N\j
eaij for j ∈ N,
that is,
(n− 1)aj −
[
i∈N\j
ai =
[
i∈N\j
eaij −
[
i∈N\j
eaji ≡ θj for j ∈ N.
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Notice that
S
j∈N
θj = 0. It is then easy to check that the solutions for this system are
all given by:
ai =
1
n

θi − θn

+ an for i ∈ N,
where an ∈ R.
Denote by ea the only real number such that u is efficient for an economy where the
initial endowments are

wi + 1
n

θi − θn

e+ eae

i∈N . The existence and unicity of such
an ea is implied by the continuity and monotonicity of preferences. Let us denote by
ex ∈ Rnk a Pareto efficient allocation in the economy where initial endowments are given
by

wi + 1
n

θi − θn

e+ eae

i∈N yielding the utility profile u.
We now prove that the allocation ex, is inOSV ((i, wi+aie)i∈N), with ai = 1n

θi − θn

+
ea, and the concessions cji = −ai + eaji for i, j ∈ N, i 9= j supporting it.
First, take any set of (n − 1) agents, say N\j. An economy where these agents have
initial endowments (wi + aie)i∈N\j and receive concessions

cji

i∈N\j is identical, by con-
struction, to an economy where agents’ initial endowments are

wi + eajie

i∈N\j. Hence,
there is an OSV value for this (n − 1)−agent economy where agent i’s utility is ui, for
all i ∈ N\j. This corresponds to the n.1) requirement in the definition of an OSV for
the n−agent economy. Furthermore, by construction, requirement n.2) is satisfied for the
concessions

cji

i,j∈N,i=j . Finally, note that ex is efficient for the n−agent economy with
initial endowments (wi + aie)i∈N,i=j and that it generates utility levels given by u.
To complete the proof of Lemma 1, we show that if an OSV for the economy (i
, wi+aie)i∈N yields the utility tuple u, then a = a. Denote by (c
j
i )i,j∈N,i=j the concessions
associated with this OSV . For any j ∈ N, define now the vector eaj ∈ Rn−1 by:
eaji ≡ ai + cji , for i ∈ N\j.
The economy where agents’ initial endowments are (wi + eajie)i∈N\j is identical, by con-
struction, to the economy with initial endowments (wi + aie)i∈N\j when the concessions
are (cji )i∈N\j . Therefore, an OSV for the (n − 1)−agent economy (wi + ea
j
ie)i∈N\j yields
the utility tuple u−j . The induction argument then implies that ea
j
i = eaji for all i ∈ N\j.
Moreover, this argument applies to all j ∈ N. Therefore,
ai + c
j
i = ai + c
j
i for all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j.
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By summing, we obtain:
[
j∈N\i
(ai + c
j
i )−
[
j∈N\i
(aj + c
i
j) =
[
j∈N\i
(ai + c
j
i )−
[
j∈N\i
(aj + c
i
j) for all i ∈ N.
By the fairness condition of both matrixes c and c,
(n− 1)ai −
[
j∈N\i
aj = (n− 1)ai −
[
j∈N\i
aj for all i ∈ N,
hence,
n(ai − ai) =
[
j∈N
aj −
[
j∈N
aj for all i ∈ N.
Therefore, the sign of the difference ai − ai is independent of i. Assume, without loss of
generality, that ai > ai for all i ∈ N . In this case, the n agents have more resources in
the economy (wi+ aie)i∈N than in the economy (w
i+ aie)i∈N , in contradiction to u being
efficient for both economies.
In the following theorem we use Lemma 1 to construct a mapping, the fixed points of
which, constitute the set of utilities achieved in OSV allocations.
Theorem 2 If agents’ preferences are strictly quasiconcave, the Ordinal Shapley Value
is non empty and satisfies individual rationality in economic environments.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. The results hold for n = 1 (they also hold
for n = 2, as was shown in the previous section). We assume the results hold for any
economy with up to (n − 1) agents and prove that they hold for any economy with n
agents.
We consider the economy (i, wi)i∈N . We proceed to construct a continuous mapping
from a suitably set of bounded utility profiles for this economy into itself. The induction
assumption plays a role in showing the set of fixed points of this mapping is non empty,
and the OSV ((i, wi)i∈N) will correspond to the set of fixed points of this mapping. We
also prove that all OSV allocations are individually rational.
The set of utility profiles that constitute the domain (as well as range) of the mapping
is denoted by H, and defined by:
H ≡

u ∈ Rn/u is Pareto efficient given w, and ui ≥ ui(0) for i = 1, ..., n

.
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In economic environments, H is a bounded set (if n− 1 players obtain at least the utility
level ui(0), there is a maximum for the utility that the remaining player can reach in any
feasible allocation). Moreover, the set H is homeomorphic to the (n − 1)−unit simplex
(see, for example, Proposition 4.6.1 in Mas-Colell (1985) for a similar result). For future
reference we denote by Hb the “border” of H, the set of all the utility vectors for which
the ith component equals ui(0) for some i. Formally,
Hb ≡ {u ∈ H/ ui = ui(0) for some i ∈ N} .
For any vector u ∈ A, we look at u−j ∈ Rn−1 for all j ∈ N. Lemma 1 provides for
each u−j a unique vector a
j ∈ Rn−1 such that an OSV for the (n − 1)−agent economy
(i, wi+ajie)i∈N/j yields the utility tuple u−j .We let c
j
i (u) ≡ a
j
i . These are the concessions
that agent j “needs” to make in order for the other n − 1 agents to achieve the utility
level u−j.
Using the concessions

cji (u)

j,i∈N,j =i we construct n “net concessions” corresponding
to u by:
Ci(u) ≡
[
j∈N\i
cij(u)−
[
j∈N\i
cji (u), for all i ∈ N.
Notice that
S
i∈N
Ci(u) = 0.
We now define a mapping from H into H. Each utility profile u in H is mapped to a
utility profile hu ∈ H by increasing (decreasing) the components associated with positive
(negative) Ci(u)s, making necessary adjustments to preserve feasibility and efficiency.
More precisely, we let
D(u) ≡ min
i∈N, Ci(u)<0
{ui − ui(0)} if C(u) 9= 0 ∈ Rn.
D(u) ≡ 0 otherwise.
Note that, if u is not in Hb (that is, if u is at the “interior” of H) then D(u) > 0 if
C(u) 9= 0.
Consider the following vector:
u(u) ≡ u+ D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1C(u) =


u1
...
un

+
D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1


C1(u)
...
Cn(u)

 .
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Denote by C(u)+ ∈ Rn the vector defined as follows: Ci(u)+ = Ci(u) if Ci(u) > 0, and
Ci(u)+ = 0 if C
i(u) ≤ 0. Similarly, denote by C(u)− ∈ Rn the vector that is defined by
Ci(u)− = C
i(u) if Ci(u) < 0, and Ci(u)− = 0 if C
i(u) ≥ 0.
If u(u) is feasible and efficient, take hu(u) = u(u).
If u(u) is feasible but not efficient, take
hu(u) = u+ D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1(C(u)− δC(u)−),
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique real number such that hu(u) previously defined is feasible
and efficient. (The efficiency requirement implies δ > 0, whereas feasibility implies δ < 1.)
If u(u) is not feasible, take
hu(u) = u+ D(u)
max
i∈N
{|Ci(u)|}+ 1(C(u)− δC(u)+),
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the unique real number such that hu(u) previously defined is feasible
and efficient. (Here, feasibility implies δ > 0, whereas efficiency implies δ < 1.)
To prove that hu(u) ∈ H, we only need to show that hui(u) ≥ ui(0) for all i. If D(u) = 0,
this property is trivially satisfied. If D(u) > 0 then C(u) 9= 0. By the definition of D(u)
and u(u), it is easy to check that for is for which Ci(u) < 0 the decrease in coordinate i
is small enough so that u(u)i ≥ ui(0). Second, if u(u)i ≥ ui(0), then the construction of
hu(u) makes sure that also hu(u)i ≥ ui(0).
Claim a: The mapping hu(u) has a interior fixed point.
To prove the claim, notice first that the mapping hu(u) is continuous. Indeed, the
function D(u) is clearly continuous. Also, C(u) is continuous as soon as the “concessions”
cij(u) are a continuous function of u. By looking at the proof of Lemma 1, we see that (by
construction) the cij(u)s are a continuous function of u. Since H is homeomorphic to an
n-unit simplex, the mapping hu(u) must have a fixed point. It now remains to show that
the fixed point cannot occur on the boundary. We prove it by the way of contradiction.
Suppose by way of contradiction that the fixed point u is on the boundary, that is,
hu(u)i = ui = ui(0) for some i ∈ N. Assume, without loss of generality that u1 = u1(0).We
claim that C1(u) > 0. First, we prove that
S
i∈N\1 c
1
i (u) > 0. Indeed, if
S
i∈N\1 c
1
i (u) ≤ 0,
then after the concessions are made, player 1 obtains at least the utility u1(w1) > u1(0)
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since the aggregate endowment at the disposal of the others is lower or equal to
S
i∈N\1w
i
and the final allocation is efficient.
Second, for u1 to equal u1(0) it is necessarily the case that ci1(u) < 0 for all i = 2, ..., n.
Otherwise, the initial endowment of player 1 when i concedes is at least w1 and hence,
because the OSV is individually rational for any environment with (n − 1) agents, his
final utility can not be u1(0). Therefore, C1(u) > 0 if u1 = u1(0).
Third, since the previous reasoning holds for every i with ui = ui(0), we also know
that D(u) > 0 since ui − ui(0) > 0 as soon as Ci(u) < 0 and Ci(u) < 0 for at least one
i ∈ N given that C1(u) > 0.
Therefore, by the construction of our mapping, the utility tuple u is mapped to a point
with a strictly larger utility level for agent 1 and cannot constitute a fixed point. This
proves Claim a.
Claim b: A utility tuple u is a fixed point of the function hu if and only if there exists
an allocation x ∈ OSV ((i, wi)i∈N) such that u(x) = u.
To prove the claim, let u be a fixed point of the previous mapping, x the feasible
allocation that yields the utility level u, and c the matrix constructed using Lemma 1 (for
simplicity, we write c, C, and D instead of c(u), C(u), and D(u)). We claim that c is the
matrix of concessions that support x as an OSV. Given the way we constructed c, each
agent is indifferent with respect to the identity of the conceding agent. Requirement n.1)
of the definition of an OSV is then immediately seen to hold. Also requirement n.2) holds
since, by interiority of the fixed point, D > 0 if Cj < 0 for some j ∈ N. In an interior
fixed point, Cj = 0 for all j ∈ N. Therefore, the concessions satisfy
S
i∈N\j c
j
i =
S
i∈N\j c
i
j
for all j ∈ N .
Notice also that the utility corresponding to any OSV is a fixed point of our mapping
by construction. Therefore, the set of utilities generated by the OSV s coincides with the
set of fixed points of the mapping hu(u).
To complete the proof of the theorem we show that every OSV allocation is individ-
ually rational for the economy (i, wi)i∈N . Assume by way of contradiction that agent
i receives a bundle strictly worse than wi in an element of OSV ((i, wi)i∈N ). It must
then be that
S
i∈N\j c
i
j > 0, hence
S
i∈N\j c
j
i > 0 as well. This however means that there
exist a j 9= i for which cji > 0. Hence if agent j concedes, agent i is in an environment
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with n − 1 agents and initial endowment wi + cjie which is strictly larger than wi. By
the induction assumption, the OSV for this environment would be preferred to wi + cjie,
hence strictly preferred to wi. This is in contradiction to the original OSV yielding an
outcome worse than wi for agent i.
This concludes the proof that the OSV exists and is individually rational.
Theorem 2 shows the OSV exists for any economic environment where agents’ prefer-
ences are strictly quasiconcave. As we have already mentioned, the proof of the theorem
uses a fixed point argument, hence it is not constructive. The proof does not provide
an algorithm to calculate the OSV in a particular economy, and yields no information
regarding the possible unicity of the solution in particular environments.
There is, however, much more information regarding the concessions associated with
OSV allocations. First, Lemma 1 implies that the matrix associated with any OSV
allocation is unique. Indeed, let x ∈ OSV ((i, wi)i∈N ) and ui ≡ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N.
For every j ∈ N, Lemma 1 says that there exists a unique vector cj ∈ Rn−1 such that an
allocation in OSV

(i, wi + cjie)i∈N\j

yields the utility tuple u−j. That is, there exists a
unique matrix of concessions supporting x as an OSV. Second, if we identify an allocation
in the OSV, then the proof of Lemma 1 indicates how to construct the unique matrix of
concessions associated with this allocation.
Finally we observe that the conditions of Theorem 2 while sufficient for existence are by
no means necessary. This is evident in the following example which has also been analyzed
in Hart (1985, example 5.7). Consider the economic environment with three agents (1, 2, 3)
and three commodities (x1, x2, x3) where preferences for non-negative consumptions and
initial endowments are given by:4
u1(x11, x
1
2, x
1
3) = x
1
1 + x
1
2 w
1 = (2, 2, 0)
4The utility functions, as given in Hart (1985) are defined just over the non-negative orthant. Note
that in our set up the utility functions need to be defined over all of Rk. This can be accomplished in
several ways without affecting the OSV outcome. One option is to let the utility function equal −∞
for all points outside the non-negative orthant. Alternately (to preserve continuity) the ui’s could be
redefined by:
u1(x11,x
1
2,x
1
3) = min{x11,2x11}+min{x12,2x12}+min{0,2x13}
and similarly for the other two agents.
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u2(x21, x
2
2, x
2
3) = 0.5x
2
1 + x
2
3 w
2 = (2, 0, 2)
u3(x31, x
3
2, x
3
3) = x
3
2 + x
3
3 w
3 = (0, 2, 2)
The OSV outcome for this environment (it also happens to be unique) is the allocation:
x1 = (4, 0.3791, 0); x2 = (0, 0, 3.2745);x3 = (0, 1.6209, 2.725)
and the concessions supporting the outcome are:
c12 = c
2
1 = 0.129 09; c
1
3 = c
3
1 = 0.119 28; c
2
3 = c
3
2 = 0.112 74.
The associated utility profile is (u1, u2, u3) = (4.3791, 3.2745, 4.3464). Note the Shapley
value yields the utility profile (4.5, 3.5, 4) whereas the Harsanyi value yields the utility
profile (13/3, 10/3, 13/3).
6 Characteristics of the OSV
By definition, the OSV allocations satisfy some fairness and consistency properties. Also,
Theorem 2 shows that they are individually rational. The OSV allocations however sat-
isfy several additional appealing properties.5 The main result of this section provides a
characterization of the OSV in terms of coalitional dividends similar to the characteriza-
tion obtained for the Shapley value. The first step towards this result is to show that the
fact that concessions in the previous example are symmetric is not a coincidence. The
concessions supporting OSV allocations are always symmetric as stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If the concession matrix c supports an OSV allocation, then cij = c
j
i for
all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. It is true for any economy with n = 2 agents
by definition (the fairness condition). We assume the property is satisfied for every econ-
omy with n− 1 agents and show it also holds for (i, wi)i∈N . Let x ∈ OSV ((i, wi)i∈N),
5We stress the fact that the following properties hold independently of the agents’ preferences being
strictly quasiconcave or not. Strict quasiconcavity is a sufficient condition for existence of the OSV , the
properties hold for every OSV allocation.
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and let (cij)i,j∈N,i=j and u ∈ Rn be the concessions supporting x and the utility tu-
ple associated with it. For any agent i ∈ N , there must exist some OSV (denoted by
y(i)) for the (n − 1)−agent economy (j, wj + cije)j∈N\i yielding the utility profile u−i.
Similarly, for any agent k ∈ N\i there must exist an OSV (denoted by y(ki)) for the
(n − 2)−agent economy (j, wj + (cij + ckij )e)j∈N\{i,k} yielding the utility profile u−{i,k},
where (ckij )k,j∈N\i,k =j ∈ R(n−1)(n−2) is the concession matrix supporting the OSV alloca-
tion y(i). By Lemma 1 there exists a unique vector a ∈ Rn−2 such that an OSV for the
(n − 2)−agent economy (j , wj + aje)j∈N\{i,k} yields the utility tuple u−{i,k}. Hence we
have wj + aje = wj + (cij + c
ki
j )e for any three distinct agents i, j, k ∈ N. By permuting
the roles of i and k we obtain:
cij + c
ki
j = c
k
j + c
ik
j for any three distinct agents i, j, k ∈ N. (5)
We will now show that c12 = c
2
1.
By (5) we have:
c12 + c
31
2 = c
3
2 + c
13
2 ,
c31 + c
23
1 = c
2
1 + c
32
1 ,
c23 + c
12
3 = c
1
3 + c
21
3 .
By the induction assumption, concessions are symmetric for any economy with (n − 1)
agents, hence c312 = c
21
3 , c
13
2 = c
23
1 , and c
32
1 = c
12
3 . Using this property and summing the
three previous equations, we obtain:
(c31 − c13) + (c12 − c21) + (c23 − c32) = 0.
We now repeat the same argument with agent 3 replaced by agents 4, ..., n and get the
following system of equations that the concessions must satisfy:
(c31 − c13) + (c12 − c21) + (c23 − c32) = 0,
...
21
(cn1 − c1n) + (c12 − c21) + (c2n − cn2 ) = 0.
Summing it up we get:
{(c31 − c13) + ...+ (cn1 − c1n)}+ (n− 2)(c12 − c21) + {(c23 − c32) + ...+ (c2n − cn2 )} = 0.
Using the fairness requirement n.2) we get:
(c12 − c21) + (n− 2)(c12 − c21) + (c12 − c21) = 0.
Hence, c12 = c
2
1.
Similarly it can be shown that cij = c
j
i for any i, j ∈ N, i 9= j.
The following two propositions provide a characterization of the OSV analogous to
the characterization of the Shapley value in terms of coalitional dividends.
Proposition 4 Let x ∈ OSV ((i, wi)i∈N) and denote ui ≡ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N. Then,
there exists a unique vector (λS)S⊆N ∈ R2
n
such that
ui

wi + di(T )e+
[
Si
S⊆T
λSe

 = ui for all T ⊆ N, for all i ∈ T, (6)
where d(T ) ∈ R|T | is the unique vector such that an element of the set OSV ((j , wj +
dj(T )e)j∈T ) yields the utility tuple uT .
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. If N = {i}, then λ{i} exists and is unique:
λ{i} = 0.
Suppose the result holds for any economy with at most n−1 agents. Let x ∈ OSV ((i
, wi)i∈N ) and u
i ≡ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N. Denote by

cij

i,j∈N,i=j the concessions supporting
x as an OSV and, for all j ∈ N, let y(j) be such that y(j) ∈ OSV ((i, wi + cjie)i∈N\j)
and y(j)i ∼i xi for all i ∈ N\j.
Applying the induction argument, for all j ∈ N, there exists a unique (λS(j))S⊆N\j ∈
R2
n−1
such that:
ui

wi + cjie+ di(T ; j)e+
[
Si
S⊆T
λS(j)e

 = ui for all T ⊆ N\j, for all i ∈ T,
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where d(T ; j) ∈ R|T | is the unique vector such that an element of the set OSV ((j
, wj + cjie + di(T ; j)e)j∈T ) yields the utility tuple uT . We first claim that λS(j) = λS(k)
for all S ⊆ N\{j, k}. Indeed, consider the economy (i, wi)i∈S and the unique vector
d(S) ∈ R|S| such that an element of OSV ((i, wi + di(S)e)i∈S) yields the utility tuple
uS. By the induction argument, there is a unique vector (λB)B⊆S ∈ R2
|S|
such that
ui

wi + di(T )e+
[
Bi
B⊆T
λBe

 = ui for all T ⊆ S, for all i ∈ T.
Since the vector d(T ) is unique, it is immediate that di(T ) = c
j
i + di(T ; j) = c
k
i + di(T ; k)
for all T ⊆ S, i ∈ T. And since the vector (λB)B⊆S is unique, it is also immediate that
λS = λS(j) = λS(k).
According to the previous claim, we can propose λS (= λS(j) for any j /∈ S) for any
S ⊂ N. With the vector (λS)S⊂N , the equality ui

wi + di(T )e+
S
Si
S⊆T
λSe

= ui holds
for all T ⊂ N and for all i ∈ T. Moreover, the vector for which the equality happens is
unique. The unique value still to be found is λN .
For any i ∈ N, consider the value λN(i) implicitly (and uniquely) defined by:
ui

wi +
[
Si
S⊂N
λSe+ λN(i)e

 = ui.
We complete the proof of the Proposition if we show that λN(i) = λN(j) for any i, j ∈ N.
By induction, for any i, j ∈ N :
ui

w
i + cjie+
[
Si
S⊆N\j
λSe

 = u
i = ui

wi +
[
Si
S⊂N
λSe+ λN (i)e

 ,
hence,
λN(i) = cji +
[
Si
S⊆N\j
λS −
[
Si
S⊂N
λS = cji −
[
S⊇{i,j}
S⊂N
λS.
Similarly,
λN(j) = cij −
[
S⊇{i,j}
S⊂N
λS.
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Given the symmetry of the concessions, cji = c
i
j , λN(i) = λN (j) for all i, j ∈ N, which
completes the proof.
Borrowing the terminology used in TU environments, we refer to the vector (λS)S⊆N as
the coalitional dividends. Although the coalitional dividends are somewhat more complex
to define in our economic environment than they are in TU environments, they reflect
the same idea: if i ∈ S, then λS is the dividend agent i obtains because he belongs to
coalition S. Indeed, given that d(N) = 0, the final utility agent i obtains in the OSV is:
ui = ui

wi +
[
Si
S⊆N
λSe

 .
The added difficulty in our framework is how to measure the value of a coalition, since
the additional utility (in terms of e) that agents in a certain coalition S obtain depends
upon the level of their initial endowment. Proposition 4 shows that the proper reference
to measure the increase in utility is given by the level of utility at the OSV. In TU
environments, the reference point is not important since the value of the coalition does
not depend on the initial endowment.
It is interesting to point out that the relationship between the coalitional dividends that
exists for every OSV allocation and the concessions matrix that supports this allocation,
is the same as the one that exists for the Shapley value in TU environments (that was
proved in Section 2). Indeed, it is easy to see that d(N\j) = (cji )i∈N\j for any j ∈ N.
Therefore, applying (6) to the sets N and N\j, we obtain:
ui

wi +
[
Si
S⊆N
λSe

 = ui = ui

w
i + cjie+
[
Si
S⊆N\j
λSe

 for any i ∈ N\j,
hence,
cji =
[
Si,j
S⊆N
λS for all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j.
Finally, in TU environments, it is also the case that if (6) holds for all T ⊆ N, then the
value is necessarily the Shapley value. That is, the decomposition described in the previous
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proposition characterizes the Shapley value. Given that, in economic environments, the
OSV can in principle be non unique, the result cannot be directly extended. However,
we can state a very similar result:
Proposition 5 Let Φ be a correspondence that associates a set of efficient allocations to
every economic environment (i, wi)i∈N . Suppose that it satisfies property (Q):
(Q) For all x ∈ Φ((i, wi)i∈N) and ui ≡ ui(xi) for all i ∈ N, there exists a vector
(µS)S⊆N ∈ R2
n
such that
ui

wi + bi(T )e+
[
Si
S⊆T
µSe

 = ui for all T ⊆ N , for all i ∈ T,
where b(T ) ∈ R|T | is a vector such that an element of the set Φ((j, wj + bje)j∈T ) yields
the utility tuple uT .
Then, Φ is a sub-correspondence of the OSV correspondence.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. We prove that any correspondence Φ that
satisfies property (Q) for economies with at most n agents is such that Φ((j, aj)j∈S) ⊆
OSV ((j, aj)j∈S), for every economic environment (j , aj)j∈S where |S| ≤ n.
When n = 1, the proof is trivial: the efficiency of Φ implies that x = ai for all
x ∈ Φ((i, ai)). We assume now that the result holds for up to n− 1 agents and show it
holds for n agents.
Take x ∈ Φ((i, wi)i∈N) and let (µS)S⊆N ∈ R2
n
be the vector associated with x.
Consider the matrix c ∈ RnxRn−1 defined by:
cji =
[
Si,j
S⊆N
µS.
We claim that the matrix c supports x as an OSV. First, given that cji = c
i
j for all
i, j ∈ N, i 9= j, condition n.2) of Definition 1 is satisfied. Second, to prove condition n.1),
take any j ∈ N and consider the economy (i, wi + cjie)i∈N\j . Notice that since
ui

wi +
[
Si
S⊆N
µSe

 = ui = ui

w
i + bi(N\j)e+
[
Si
S⊆N\j
µSe

 for all i ∈ N\j,
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it happens that
bi(N\j) =
[
Si,j
S⊆N
µS = c
j
i for all i ∈ N\j.
Therefore, the utility tuple u−j is attainable (and efficient) in the economy (i, wi +
cjie)i∈N\j since it is attainable (and efficient) in (i, wi + bi(N\j)e)i∈N\j. Denote by y(j)
the efficient allocation that yields u−j . Since for all T ⊆ N\j,

bi(T )− cji

i∈T is a vector
such that an element of the set Φ((j, wj + cjie+ [bj(T )− c
j
i ]e)j∈T ) yields the utility tuple
u−j , the induction hypothesis ensures that y(j) ∈ OSV ((i, wi + cjie)i∈N\j). This proves
condition n.1) and concludes the proof of the proposition.
Therefore, the OSV correspondence is characterized as the union of the correspon-
dences (or as the largest correspondence) that satisfy property (Q).
We conclude this section by proving further properties of the OSV . The next proposi-
tion shows that the OSV is monotonic in initial endowments. That is, if two agents have
identical preferences and furthermore, one agent has the same or more of every commodity
in his initial endowment, then that agent is better off in any OSV allocation.
Proposition 6 Consider an economic environment (i, wi)i∈N where j≡k and wj ≥
(>)wk for some j 9= k. Then, xj j ("j)xk for any x ∈ OSV ((i, wi)i∈N).
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction. Consider first the case of two agents (n = 2)
and assume 1≡2 . Let u represent the preferences of both agents. The unique level of
utility that they achieve in the OSV allocations for this economy is:
Max
c∈R+

u(w1 + ce), u(w2 + ce)
 u(w1 + ce), u(w2 + ce)

∈ A

.
It is then immediate that w1 ≥ w2 implies x1 1 x2, for x = OSV ((i, wi)i=1,2).Moreover,
x1 is strictly preferred to x2 if w1 is strictly greater than w2.
We assume now that the property holds for economies with up to n − 1 agents. We
prove, by contradiction, that it also holds for economies with n agents.
Without loss of generality, suppose 1≡2, w1 ≥ w2, and x1 ≺1 x2 for some x ∈
OSV ((i, wi)i∈N ). (For notational convenience, we do the proof for the case w1 ≥ w2;
the proof is similar when w1 > w2.) Using property n.1) in the definition of an OSV,
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let y(1) ∈ OSV ((i, wi + c1i e)i∈N\1) be such that ui(y(1)i) = ui(xi) for all i ∈ N\1, and
y(2) ∈ OSV ((i, wi + c2i e)i∈N\2) be such that ui(y(2)i) = ui(xi) for all i ∈ N\2.
Given that ui(y(1)i) = ui(y(2)i) for all i ∈ N\{1, 2}, u1(y(2)1) < u2(y(1)2), 1≡2,
and the efficiency of the allocations y(1) and y(2), it must be the case that the total
initial resources in the economy (i, wi + c1i e)i∈N\1 are larger than in the economy (i
, wi + c2i e)i∈N\2. That is,
[
i∈N\1
c1i >
[
i∈N\2
c2i .
By the symmetry of the concessions, c12 = c
2
1, c
1
i = c
i
1 and c
2
i = c
i
2 for all i ∈ N\{1, 2}.
Therefore,
[
i∈N\{1,2}
ci1 >
[
i∈N\{1,2}
ci2.
Let k ∈ N\{1, 2} be such that ck1 > ck2, and y(k) ∈ OSV ((i, wi+ cki e)i∈N\k) be such that
ui(y(k)i) = ui(xi) for all i ∈ N\k. In the (n− 1)−agent economy ((i, wi + cki e)i∈N\k), it
happens that 1≡2 and w1 + ck1e > w2 + ck2e. By the induction hypothesis, u1(y(k)1) ≥
u2(y(k)2), that is, u1(x1) ≥ u2(x2). This is in contradiction to our original hypothesis.
The next property, anonymity of the OSV is an immediate corollary of the previous
proposition.
Corollary 2 Consider an economic environment (i, wi)i∈N where j≡k and wj =
wk for some j 9= k. Then, xj ?j xk for any x ∈ OSV ((i, wi)i∈N). Moreover, if the
preferences of agents j and k are strictly quasiconcave, then xj = xk for any x ∈ OSV ((i
, wi)i∈N ).
Proof. The first part of the Corollary is immediate after Proposition 6. The efficiency
of x and the strict quasiconcavity of the common preference relation j , imply that
xj = xk as soon as uj(xj) = uk(xk).
Note that the nucleolus, an ordinal solution concept for exchange economies (McLean
and Postlewaite (1989)), does not satisfy the previous anonymity property. It does satisfy
however the following symmetry property: If agents j and k are identical and the allocation
x is in the nucleolus, then the allocation y is also in the nucleolus, where yj = xk, yk = xj,
and yi = xi otherwise.
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7 The weighted OSV
Shapley (1953b) extends the Shapley TU value by considering nonsymmetric divisions
of the surplus. He defines the (now called) weighted Shapley value by stipulating an
exogenously given system of weights q ∈ Rn++, assigning each agent i the share qi/
S
j∈N qj
of the unit in each unanimity game, and defining the value as the linear extension of this
operator to the set of TU games. There exist several characterizations of the weighted
Shapley value. The next proposition states, without a proof, a new characterization,
similar to the one provided in Corollary 1.6
Proposition 7 A value ξ is the q−weighted Shapley value if and only if for each game
(N, v) there exists a matrix of concessions c(N, v) ≡ (cij(N, v))i,j∈N,i=j, with cij(N, v) in
R for all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j, such that:
(1) ξi(N, v) = ξi(N\j, v) + cji (N, v) for all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j, and
(2)
S
i∈N\j
qjcji (N, v) =
S
i∈N\j
qicij(N, v) for all j ∈ N.
Following the same route we took in defining the OSV , we can define a weighted value
for economic environments where the weights of the agents are taken into account. We
now describe an extension of the OSV which yields the q− weighted OSV (q − wOSV )
solution, which reduces to the q− weighted Shapley value in economic environments that
can be described as a TU environment. The only difference with respect to the definition
of the OSV lies in the “fairness” condition n.2) :
Definition 2 We define the q− weighted Ordinal Shapley Value recursively.
(n = 1) In the case of an economy with one agent with preferences 1 and initial
endowments a1 ∈ Rk, the q − wOSV is given by the initial endowment: q − wOSV (1
, a1) = {a1} .
Suppose that the solution has been defined for any economy with (n−1) or less agents.
(n) In the case of an economy (i, ai)i∈N with a set N of n agents, the q−wOSV ((i, ai)i∈N)
is the set of efficient allocations (xi)i∈N for which there exists an n−tuple of concession
vectors (ci)i∈N that satisfy
6For interpretation, see also Section 4 in Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001).
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n.1) for all j ∈ N, there exists y(j) ∈ q − wOSV

(i, ai + cjie)i∈N\j

such that xi ∼i
y(j)i for all i ∈ N\j, and
n.2)
S
i∈N\j
qjcji =
S
i∈N\j
qicij for all j ∈ N.
It is worthwhile to notice that the “weighted fairness” condition n.2), together with the
“consistency” requirement n.1) also imply in this case that the concessions that support
the q−wOSV are “weighted” symmetric, in that we have qjcji = qicij for all i, j ∈ N, i 9= j.
Moreover, very small changes in the proof of Theorem 2 are needed, to establish existence
and individual rationality of this value, for any economic environment where agents’
preferences are strictly quasiconcave, which we state as:
Theorem 3 If agents’s preferences are strictly quasiconcave, the q−weighted Ordinal
Shapley Value is non empty and satisfies individual rationality in economic environments,
for any q ∈ Rn++.
8 Conclusion
This paper addressed the problem of sharing a joint surplus among the agents creating it.
We looked for a method associating with each economic environment (agents described by
preferences and endowments) a set of outcomes (allocations of the aggregate endowment
across the agents). We showed there exists such an (ordinal) sharing method that satisfies
efficiency and suitably defined notions of consistency and fairness. These notions reduce
to the usual notions of consistency and fairness satisfied by the Shapley value for TU
games, hence the first reason for calling this solution concept an Ordinal Shapley Value.
The OSV provided not just an allocation but also a matrix of concessions “measuring”
the gains each agent foregoes in favor of the other agents. Further analysis showed these
concessions were symmetric, what agent i concedes to agent j coincides with the conces-
sion of agent j to agent i. This symmetry property reduces to the balanced contributions
property of the Shapley Value for TU games. The next stage of the analysis character-
ized the OSV providing a fixed system of coalitional dividends, which when augmented
by coalition specific transfers yields allocations equivalent to the OSV outcome for all
possible coalitions. Furthermore, when it is possible to find such a system for a given
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allocation rule, then this allocation rule is a subset of the OSV outcome. This again has
its counterpart for the Shapley value in TU games. We further showed that the OSV
satisfies monotonicity in initial endowments and anonymity. Finally, we constructed a
family of q−weighted OSV ’s, which are the ordinal counterparts (in our setting) to the
family of q−weighted Shapley values for TU games.
The OSV is a natural extension of the Shapley value to general environments (NTU
games). The main advantage of this extension compared to previous attempts to extend
the value is the fact it is ordinal, depending only on the underlying preferences and not
on their numerical representation. It is also defined in the commodity space rather in the
“utility” space, whereas several previous ordinal values were defined solely on the utility
space (Samet and Safra, 2001). It naturally shares most of the attractive properties of
the Shapley Value, and thus offers important insights augmenting those derived from
another ordinal solution concept, the ordinal nucleolus (McLean and Postlewaite, 1989).
The connections between the OSV and another well-known ordinal solution concept, the
competitive equilibrium outcome, remain the topic of further research.
The sharing method proposed in this paper provides a solution concept for a large
class of environments. It can be used to address a variety of distributional issues in more
realistic environments dispensing of the need to assume quasi-linear preferences. Problems
of allocating joint costs can be handled as well without restricting the environment through
the quasi-linearity in “money” assumption.
Our approach has been normative and it would be interesting to construct game forms
that implement it. Pe´rez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) provide a deterministic mecha-
nism that implements the Shapley value in pure strategy Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.
The analysis throughout the paper proceeded under the assumption of complete in-
formation. Allowing for asymmetric information and examining solution concepts in such
settings remains another interesting avenue of research.
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Figure 1:
The solution in the two-agent economy
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